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"Why do good people and their governments repeatedly tum away 
from intervention that could halt genocides and other mass abuses of 
human beings?" 
"What devaluation of human lives could possibly allow this?" 
I began to examine such questions when I became aware of the in-
difference toward the vast scale of atrocities being perpetrated in Darfur, 
Sudan. I saw a connection between earlier research I had published with 
David Fetherstonhaugh and colleagues in 19971 and subsequent research 
with Deborah Small and George Loewenstein.2 Specifically, this work 
documented the insensitivity to large numbers of lives at risk that we la-
beled psychophysical numbing, consistent with the general nonlinear 
model of valuation proposed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
(1979) in their landmark paper on prospect theory.3 Subsequent studies 
uncovered additional evidence of insensitivity described as compassion 
fade and, in some cases, compassion collapse, where valuation actually 
decreases and may even collapse to zero as the number of lives at stake 
increases.4 All of this helps explain why many who care greatly about in-
dividual lives lose their enthusiasm and compassion when the numbers 
get large. Slovic, Zionts, Woods, Goodman, and Jinks proposed some 
1. See David Fetherstonhaugh, Paul Slavic, Stephen M. Johnson & James Freidrich, Insensitivi-
ty to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 283 
(1997). 
2. See Deborah A. Small, George Loewenstein & Paul Slavic, Sympathy and Callousness: The 
Impact of Deliberative Thought on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims, 102 
0RGANIZA TIONAL BEHA V. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 143 (2007}. 
3. See Daniel Kahncman & Amos Tvcrsky, An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
4. See, e.g., Ezra M. Markowitz, Paul Slavic, Daniel Viistfjiill & Sara D. Hodges, Compassion 
Fade and the Challenge of Environmental Conservation, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 397 
(2013}; Daniel Viistfjiill, Paul Slavic, Marcus Mayorga & Ellen Peters, Compassion Fade: Affect and 
Charity Are Greatest for a Single Child in Need, 9 PLoS ONE 1 (2014}. 
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procedures that might infuse the dry statistics of atrocities with enough 
emotion to motivate people to care enough to act.5 
But yet another problem beyond numbing, at the very foundation of 
valuation, decision-making, and action has become apparent. It is easy to 
view inaction on the part of powerful and well-intentioned governments 
as resulting primarily from a lack of direction or pressure from a numbed 
public that places little value on saving foreign lives. In her Pulitzer Prize 
winning book, Samantha Power concluded that: "[G]enocide in distant 
lands has not captivated senators, congressional caucuses ... lobbyists ... 
or individual citizens .... The battle to stop genocide has thus been re-
peatedly lost in the realm of domestic politics .... It takes political pres-
sure to put genocide on the map in Washington."6 
True enough, and a testimony to the indifference on the part of a 
numbed citizenry that doesn't feel an emotional connection to different 
suffering. But genocides and mass atrocities of recent years in places such 
as Rwanda, Darfur, and Syria have been thoroughly documented while 
they were taking place and that documentation has included emotionally 
jarring testimony and images. Something more than numbness must be 
impeding action. Is it a matter of values? 
It was easy to blame the Bush administration for being uncaring. 
Even when Colin Powell returned from Darfur in 2004 and used the "G 
word" to describe the atrocities there, no action was taken? Then the 
Obama administration came to power and hopes soared. Surely 
President Obama cared about humanitarian causes, and he was sur-
rounded aides, including Samantha Power, who certainly placed high 
value on human lives. In fact, Ambassador Power has recalled that at her 
first meeting with the President he was greatly interested in her book and 
its documentation of repeated failures of the American government to 
live up to its ideals.8 Yet six years into an administration most likely to 
succeed in taking action to mitigate or halt mass atrocities, little seems to 
have changed-certainly not in Darfur. What's going on? 
Perhaps psychology can again provide some explanation. Aided by 
valuable discussions with colleagues Robin Gregory, David Frank, and 
Daniel Vastfjall, I sought insight from data I began collecting in 1961. 
That research examined how people made decisions between two op-
tions that were equally valuable to them.9 Consider a gift package made 
up of two components-cash and a coupon worth $X, redeemable at a 
5. Paul Slovic, David Zionts, Andrew K. Woods, Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Psychic 
Numbing and Mass Atrocity, in THE BEHA VJORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PuBLIC POLICY 126 (Eldar Shaf. 
ired., 2012). 
6. SAMANlHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 509 
(2013). 
7. David Hancock, Colin Powell and the G-Word, CBS (ScpL 9, 2004, 8:20 AM), 
hUp://www.cbsnews.com/news/colin-poweU-and-the-g-word/. 
8. Evan Osnos, In the Land of the Possible, NEW YORKER (Dec. 22, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12122Jland-possible?currentPage=all. 
9. Paul Slovic, Choice Between Equally Valued Ahernatives, 1 J. ExPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: 
HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 280 (1975). 
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store you like. There are two such packages. Package A gives you more 
cash than Package B, but you are able to increase B's advantage in the 
value of the coupon book by enough to make the two gifts equally attrac-
tive to you. But you have to choose. Which one would you take? Naive 
theories would predict you will flip a coin, thus being equally likely to 
choose A or B. That didn't happen. Eighty-eight percent of respondents, 
each of whom had individually adjusted the packages to make them 
equally attractive for them, made the choice in the same direction.10 
What do you think they did? If you predicted that they chose the pack-
age with the greater amount of cash, you are correct.11 
Similar results occurred with choices among nine other pairs of two-
attribute "bundles," such as baseball players (described by batting aver-
age and number of home-run hits), secretarial applicants (described by 
typing speed and typing accuracy), and so onP In every case, choices 
among individually equated pairs were highly predictable, with about 
eighty percent of respondents adhering to the following the rule: choose 
the option that is better on the attribute that is inherently more im-
portant (e.g., cash, or batting average, or typing accuracy)P 
Not trusting the adjustment method used to equate the options in 
each pair, I finally found a way to overcome my methodological concerns 
and published these findings after more than a decade.14 Some thirteen 
years later, Amos Tversky and Shmuel Sattath incorporated this "more 
important dimension effect" into a new theory of choice.15 The core find-
ing was named "the prominence effect."16 The essence of this effect is 
that, although we may have a qualitative sense of the importance of val-
ued attributes, we may not have a sense of the appropriate quantitative 
tradeoffs when these attributes compete with one another.17 For exam-
ple, we highly value both affordability and safety in a car, but how much 
more we should be willing to spend for a specific increment in safety is by 
no means obvious to us. We struggle with making tradeoffs and seek a 
simple, defensible way to choose among options whose attributes are im-
portant but conflicting. Here is where the prominence effect enters: don't 
struggle to perform any quantitative calculations to weigh and compare 
valued objectives. Choose what is best according to the most promi-
nent-that is the most defensible-attributes. You can't go wrong. You 
can well defend your choice to yourself and others. Moreover, it likely 
"feels" right. 
So what does this have to do with valuing foreign lives and geno-
cide? A lot. 
10. /d. at 284. 
11. /d. at 283-M. 
12 /d. at 283. 
13. /d. at 284. 
14. Su id. at 280. 
15. Amos Tversky, Shmuel Sattath & Paul Slovic, Contingent Weighting in Judgement and 
Choice, 95 PsYCOL. REV. 371 (1988). 
16. /d. at 375, 382~3. 
17. /d. at 375-76. 
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It is well recognized that decisions to save civilian lives by interven-
ing in foreign countries' domestic affairs are among the most difficult and 
controversial choices facing national decision makers. Although each sit-
uation is unique, such decisions typically involve tradeoffs that pit the 
value of human lives against other important objectives. And on rare oc-
casions we do decide to intervene. In 2011, the United States supported 
military action to protect the lives of civilians living in Libya,18 and more 
recently the American military intervened arfressively to protect a 
threatened population of Yezidi people in Iraq. 9 On the other hand, the 
United States has done little to intervene in the genocide in Darfur or to 
halt the barrel bombings and other government-led atrocities in Syria 
that have led to hundreds of thousands of deaths and millions of dis-
placed people.20 
The inconsistencies are striking. Why intervene in some situations 
and not in others that, by the numbers, seem far worse? And how do we 
reconcile the immense value our society places on an individual life with 
our failure to respond to the plight of millions? What are our true values 
when it comes to saving human lives? Should we accept these inconsist-
encies? Are we oblivious to them? Are other objectives really important 
enough to outweigh millions of lives? Why can't sheer numbers, once 
great enough, tip the scales toward at least some forms of meaningful in-
tervention if not outright troops on the ground? 
The light bulb switched on in 2012 when I was at a conference in 
Jerusalem, listening to a presentation by social psychologist Nurit 
Schnabel, and her colleagues Ilanit SimanTov-Nachlieli and Arie 
Nadler.21 The title of their talk says it all: "Sensitivity to Moral Threats 
Increases When Safety Needs Are Satisfied: Evidence of Hierarchical 
Organization of Psychological Needs."22 Their conclusion jumped out at 
me: consistent with Maslow's hierarchy of needs, the basic need for secu-
rity must be satisfied before people will respond to higher order needs.23 
In other words, when security is tenuous moral action to help others is 
unlikely. 
Immediately I thought of the prominence effect, where determiners 
of choice are found to be hierarchical (we called it lexicographical), 
18. See Jim Garamonc, Obama Makes Case for U.S. Participation in Libya, U.S. DEPT. OF DEF. 
(Mar. 28, 2011), hltp:l/www.deCense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63342; Genocide Prevention Initia-
tive, UNIV. OFOR., http://blogs.uoregon.edu/prevent/about-2/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
19. U.S Provides Aid to Yelidis, Strikes /S/L Mortar Position, U.S. DEPT. OF DEF. (Aug. 13, 
2014), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122914. 
20. See Fred Hiatt, Why Does the U.S. 'Stand so Idly by' on Syria?, Wash. Post, May 4, 2014, 
http:l/www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fred-hiatt-why-does-the-us-stand-so-idly-by-on-
syria/2014/05/04/88a9ca4a-d20b-11e3-937f-d3026234b51c_story.html; Eric Reeves, A Nightmare Im-
possible to "Slumber" Through, SUDAN TRIB. (Dec. 31, 2014), 
http://www.sudantribunc.com/spip.php?articlc53500. 
21. Nurit Shnabel, Danit Simantov-Nachlieli & Arie Nadler, Tel Aviv University, Sensitivity to 
Moral Threats Increases when Safety Needs are Satisfied: Evidence of Hierarchical Organization of 
Psychological Needs (June 6, 2012). 
22 /d. 
23. A. H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCOL REv. 370, 376-380 (1943). 
28 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW SLIP OPINIONS [Vol. 2015 
which means satisfying the most important attributes with little or no 
compensation allowed for lesser attributes. That is, prominent attributes 
trump less prominent factors. Prominence is driven by the need to justify 
and defend one's decisions and actions in a way not called for when 
simply stating one's values. And what is the most prominent set of values 
in today's foreign policy world? National security interests! Could the 
unquestioned importance of national security explain, at least in part, the 
disconnect between the lofty expressed values of our government for 
protecting distant lives and the minimal valuation of those lives revealed 
by government inaction when millions are threatened? 
The rhetoric of the two most recent American presidents leaves no 
doubt that, in terms of expressed values, national security and humani-
tarian lifesaving are both vital objectives. Speaking on CNN in January 
of 2009, George W. Bush remarked: "The most important job I have 
had-and the most important job the next president is going to have-is 
to protect the American public from another [terrorist] attack."24 Barack 
Obama echoed this sentiment, saying: "I have a solemn duty and respon-
sibility to keep the American people safe. That's my most important ob-
ligation as President and Commander-in-Chief."25 Yet both leaders ex-
pressed equally high valuation for life saving. Speaking at the Holocaust 
Museum in Washington, DC, President Obama stated that we need to do 
everything we can to prevent and end atrocities: "I made it clear that 
'preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security inter-
est and a core moral responsibility of the United States of America. "'26 
I am drawn to the hypothesis that, because of the prominence ef-
fect, lofty humanitarian values are systematically devalued in the deci-
sion-making process. When intervention to protect thousands of name-
less, faceless lives in a distant land is seen to increase risks to national 
security, security invariably wins. Decisions in support of security appear 
vastly more defensible than decisions to protect distant lives. In the few 
recent situations where the United States has intervened with the stated 
objective of saving lives, there were presumed security benefits as well, 
thus no conflict between objectives. We attacked Saddam Hussein, not 
because he was a mass murderer, but because we believed he possessed 
and might use weapons of mass destruction.27 When Libyan leader 
Muammar Gaddafi threatened to go door to door in Benghazi, killing 
anyone who opposed his regime, the United States joined a NATO coati-
24. Bush: President's Priority Is Preventing Anack, CNN (Jan. 14, 2009, 4:24 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POUTICS/01n4/bush.lkl.interview/. 
25. David Remnick, Going the Distance: On and Off the Road with Barack Obama, NEW 
YoRKER, Jan. 27, 2014, http://www.newyorker.cornlmagazine/2014/01127/going-the-distance-2. 
26. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (Apr. 
23, 2012) (transcript available in the White House Office of the Press Secretary), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04123/remarks-president-united-states-holocaust-
memorial-museum. 
27. Bush, Blair: Time Running out for Saddam, CNN (Jan. 31, 2003, 11:37 PM), 
http:l/edition.cnn.com/2003/US/01131/sprj.irq.bush.blair.topics/. 
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tion to topple him from power.28 But he, too, was considered a threat to 
security, long seen as a loose cannon addicted to violence at home and 
elsewhere. His menacing visage adorned the cover of Time magazine 
four times since 1986, when Ronald Reagan referred to him as "this mad 
dog of the Middle East."29 When the United States recently decided to 
come to the rescue of thousands of Y azidis threatened by ISIS in Iraq, 
we were also protectin~ American military and diplomatic personnel sta-
tioned in nearby Erbil. 0 Without that security objective, would we have 
aided the Yazidis? 
In contrast, humanitarian intervention in Darfur appears to have 
been blocked by security objectives in addition to the military and do-
mestic political costs. We have long sought to obtain intellifence regard-
ing terrorist operations from the Sudanese govemment.3 In addition, 
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who takes a back seat to no one as a 
murderer, has been protected by the Chinese ~ovemment, which for 
many years was the major buyer of Sudanese oil. 2 An action against al-
Bashir that strained relations with China would have jeopardized U.S. 
economic and military interests. 
One of the most stunning conclusions by Samantha Power in her 
book The Problem from Hell was that America's repeated refusals to 
end genocide were not "accidental products of neglect" but rather "They 
were concrete choices made by the country's most influential deci-
sionmakers after unspoken and explicit weighing of costs and 
benefits." 33 
But if the prominence effect is indeed infiltrating top-level policy 
decisions and causing decision makers to systematically devalue humani-
tarian actions, I doubt that the decision makers are consciously aware of 
this. The prominence mechanism driving the decision-making process is 
not consciously expressed devaluation of distant lives; this would be ab-
horrent to leaders who truly do value those lives. Rather, I believe that 
prominent objectives, in particular those offering enhanced security, 
draw attention away from less prominent goals. All eyes are on options 
that protect the homeland, and decision makers fixated on the security 
28. President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on Libya (Mar. 83, 2011) (transcript availa-
ble in the White House Office of the Press Secretary), available at http://www.whitchousc.gov/the-
press-office/2011/03128/remarks-president-address·nation-libya. 
29. President Ronald Reagan, the Presidents News Conference (Apr. 9, 1986) available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid: 37105. See, e.g., The World After Gaddaji, TIME, Sep. 5, 2011; 
What if He Doesn 't Go?: The War Against Gaddaji, TIME, Apr. 4, 2011; Target Gaddaji, T IME, Apr. 21, 
1986. 
30. Dana Ford & Josh Levs, 'Heroic ' Mission Rescues Desperate Yazidis from ISIS, CNN (Aug. 
16,2014, 11:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/11/world/meast/iraq-rescue-missionl. 
31. Madeleine K. Albright, Former Sec. of St., Statement to the National Commission on Terror-
ist Attacks upon the United States (Mar. 23, 2004). 
32 See Christopher Alessi & Stephanie Hanson, Expanding China-Africa Oil Ties, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/chinalexpanding-china-africa-oil-ties/p9557; Nat 
Hentoff. Al-Bashir's Genocide Ho"ors Began and Continue in Darfur, CATO INST. (Oct. 9, 2013), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/al-bashirs-genocide-horrors-began-continue-darfur. 
33. POWER, supra note 6, at 508. 
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objectives likely fail to consider seriously the millions of people under 
siege and left to die. Compensatory weighing of costs and benefits asso-
ciated with seeking security and saving distant lives is not really occur-
ring. 
Thus meaningful action to prevent genocide and mass atrocities fac-
es two psychological obstacles. The prominence effect leads to decisions 
that favor inaction, even when this contravenes deeply held values. And 
decision makers can get away with this because the public is psychologi-
cally numbed. As Samantha Power observed: "No U.S. president has ev-
er made genocide prevention a priority, and no U.S. president has ever 
suffered politically for his indifference to its occurrence. It is thus no co-
incidence that genocide rages on."34 
My colleagues and I have been working to design laboratory exper-
iments to test these speculations about the psychological prominence of 
security in values revealed through decisions. In a recent pilot study, we 
posed the humanitarian crisis in Syria (prior to the involvement of ISIS) 
to respondents instructed to play the role of the U.S. President. The ob-
jective of protecting 100,000 civilian lives by creating a "safe zone" was 
pitted against the decision to not intervene in order to minimize the po-
litical and military risks of intervention. We assumed the latter objectives 
would be prominent. Preliminary results support the hypothesis that an 
individual's strongly expressed values for intervening to protect lives are 
often contravened by that same person's decisions in favor of noninter-
vention for the sake of security. 
But amidst this sobering view contrasting our stated values and our 
revealed values, the pilot study did offer a ray of hope that needs to be 
pursued. We found a strong order effect in our data. One group of our 
respondents was first asked to think about their values for the competing 
objectives and to quantify them on a 0-100 rating scale of importance. 
One of the rated objectives was not intervening in order to protect na-
tional interests and national security. The objective of the alternative ac-
tion, intervention, was characterized by three subgoals: 
(1) Create a no-fly zone to stop Syrian airplanes from attacking citi-
zens; (2) Place U.S. troops on the border of the safe zone to protect it; 
(3) Have U.S. troops accompany ground shipments of food and medicine 
to ensure their delivery to the safe zone. 
Those who first decided whether to intervene or not made decisions 
that conflicted with their subsequent ratings of their goals on the 0-100 
scale. As predicted by the prominence hypothesis, choices often favored 
nonintervention to a degree that was not consistent with respondents' 
stated values, which tended to assign greater importance to objectives 
linked to intervention. 
However, those who first searched their souls and expressed their 
values quantitatively for the various objectives subsequently made choic-
34. Id. at XXI. 
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es that were highly consistent with their expressed values. This suggests 
that introduction of techniques known as decision analysis and value-
focused thinking35 may help policy makers act in ways that don't contra-
dict their expressed values. 
Prominence appears likely to be aligned with immediate and certain 
benefits to individuals whom we care about. Without incorporating deci-
sion analysis and value-focused thinking, it will be difficult to defend ac-
tions that protect distant, anonymous masses from genocides and mass 
atrocities. 
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